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ESSAY REVIEW

Creating the Kingdom of Ends by Christine Korsgaard. Cambridge
University Press, 1996. Pp. 442 (indexed). The Sources of Normativity by
Christine Korsgaard. Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp 273
(indexed).
JOHN HARE, Calvin College
I want to start by saying that I have found Christine Korsgaard the most
helpful current exegete of Kant's moral philosophy. She has given us a
series of articles, collected into a book Creating the Kingdom of Ends, and
another book, The Sources of Normativity, which consists of her Tanner lectures at Cambridge, responses by various philosophers, and her reply to
the responses. In this second book she has raised what she calls "the normative question", which is the question for a moral agent, "Why should I
be moral?", where this is understood not as a prudential question ("Why is
morality in my interest?"), but a question about justification all things considered, "Why should I accept the moral demand as a demand upon me?".
Korsgaard's isolating this question for analysis has been extremely fruitful.
I am going to suggest, however, that her answer to the question is neither
true nor true to Kant.
A good place to start is with Korsgaard's account of the central place that
autonomy occupies in Kant's moral theory. An autonomous agent, for
Kant, is both the legislator of the moral law and in submission to it.
Korsgaard claims that this combination allows us to answer her normative
question. She says that autonomy is the source of obligation, or alternatively the source of all value.! The argument for this starts from the fact that we
are reflective beings, and this means that we have to act under the idea of
freedom. 2 This is not to say that we cannot act under the bidding of desire
or of some outside authority, but the reflective mind must endorse the bidding. We must "make it our maxim" to do what the desire or the outside
authority bids us do. The free will must be in this sense self-determining.
But because the will is a causality, it must also act according to some law or
other, "since the concept of a causality entails that of laws"? The will therefore has to be its own law. This way of putting the point relies on the notion
of causality as essentially under law. We can say alternatively that the will
is practical reason, and therefore cannot be conceived as acting and choosing for no reason. Reasons are derived from universal principles or laws,
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and so the free will must have such a principle. But because the will is free,
no law or principle can be merely imposed on it from outside. Kant concludes that the will must have its own law or principle. Korsgaard then presents an elegant argument that this law must be equivalent to the categorical imperative, as represented by the Formula of Universal Law. "The
problem faced by the free will is this: the will must have a law, but because
the will is free, it must be its own law. And nothing determines what that
law must be. All that it has to be is a law. Now consider the content of the
categorical imperative, as represented by the Formula of Universal Law.
The categorical imperative merely tells us to choose a law. Its only constraint on our choice is that it has the form of a law. And nothing determines what the law must be. All that it has to be is a law."4
I will make two objections to this argument. First, it is not true that all
practical reasons are derived from universal principles or laws, if this is
taken to mean that individual or singular reference has to be excluded.
Korsgaard fleshes out the requirement of universality as follows, "If I give
myself a law, if I am not merely the place where an impulse is operating,
then what I do essentially involves a reference to other occasions when I
might do otherwise. ...And that means that if I am to regard this act, the
one I do now, as the act of my will, I must at least make a claim to universality, a claim that the reason for which I act now will be valid on other
occasions, or on occasions of this type -including this one, conceived in a general way. Again, the form of the act of the will is general. The claim to generality, to universality, is essential to an act's being an act of the will."s It is
a mistake, however, to think that practical reasons have to be universalizable in the strong sense that singular reference has to be eliminable from all
parts of them. We need to distinguish various term-positions in a judgement, and see that the universalizability requirement does not function
symmetrically with respect to all of them. If I judge that I ought to help
my son Paul with his homework, I am committed by the strong universalizability requirement to the judgement that anyone in my sort of circumstances (including being a father) ought to help anyone in Paul's sort of circumstances (including being the father's son). But once we distinguish
between what I have elsewhere called the agent position, the recipient
position and the action position in the judgement, we can see that I can
have a practical reason as long as I am committed to helping Paul whenever he is in this sort of circumstance.6 The term in the action position is here
universal (namely, helping with homework), but this does not require that
the terms in agent position and recipient position be universalizable as
well. In Korsgaard's language, an occasion could be "conceived in a general way" as follows: whenever Paul has homework and needs my help
with it. There may be an argument which Korsgaard (or Kant) can provide
which would show that universalizability is required of practical reasons
in all their term positions. But she has not provided such an argument, and
I do not know of any such argument which does not beg the key questions.
So we can grant that giving practical reasons requires some degree of generality, for otherwise we would not be giving reasons. But the strong universalizability requirement does not follow from this, and it is the strong
requirement that Kant needs in order to show the equivalence of autono-
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my and following the categorical imperative. If I am right about practical
reasons, we can formulate a weaker notion of autonomy, such that an
agent puts herself under the moral law, whether her maxim is universalizable in all its term positions or only in the action position. This weaker
notion of autonomy will be consistent with a natural interpretation
(though not Kant's own) of the formula of the moral law as treating other
people as ends in themselves. But it will not generate the equivalence with
the categorical imperative which Korsgaard wants.
I am going to focus, however, on a second objection. Even if we could
show the equivalence of autonomy and following universal law, and even
if moral law were necessarily fully universalizable (in the way I have just
denied) we would still not have shown the equivalence of autonomy and
following the moral law. Korsgaard concedes this, when she admits the
distinction between the categorical imperative and the moral law. 7 This
distinction is the residue she accepts from the otherwise unsuccessful
"empty formalism" objection to Kant which has been lobbed at him from
at least Fichte onwards. Korsgaard says, "Now the Kantian argument
which I just described establishes that the categorical imperative is the law of
a free will. But it does not establish that the moral law is the law of a free
will. Any law is universal, but the argument I just gave doesn't settle the
question of the domain over which the law of the free will must range. And
there are various possibilities here. If the law is the law of acting on the
desire of the moment, then the agent will treat each desire as a reason, and
her conduct will be that of a wanton. If the law ranges over the agent's
whole life, then the agent will be some sort of egoist. It is only if the law
ranges over every rational being that the resulting law will be the moral
law."s Korsgaard then proceeds to give an argument to show that reflection requires extending the domain in this way to every rational being, and
this is the argument which I think (alas!) fails. 9
Korsgaard's argument is that what distinguishes humans from other
animals is their ability to act on the basis of a self-conception, what she
calls "a practical identity". Humans have many different such identities,
such as "mother", "philosopher", "American". But she thinks these identities share the feature that they give rise to unconditional obligations.
"When an action cannot be performed without loss of some fundamental
part of one's identity, and an agent could just as well be dead, then the
obligation not to do it is unconditional and complete."10 The acting self
here concedes to the thinking self its right to governance. "This is a relation not of mere power but rather of authority. And that is the authority
that is the source of obligation". It is true, Korsgaard concedes, that an
agent can shed practical identities, by ceasing to think of herself as a mother or an American. But she cannot, as an agent, have no practical identity
at all. For unless she is committed to some conception of her practical identity, she will lose her grip on herself as having any reason to do one thing
rather than another - and with it, her grip on herself as having any reason
to live and act at all. And now the conclusion. This reason for conforming
to her particular practical identities is not a reason that springs from those
particular practical identities. It is a reason that springs from her humanity
itself, from her identity simply as a human being, a reflective animal who
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needs reasons to act and to live. And this means she has recognized the
force of the moral law, or at least, it does so if valuing humanity in her own
person rationally requires valuing it in the persons of others.ll
I do not think this argument works. As I see it, the problematic point is
where Korsgaard assumes that practical identities generate unconditional
obligations, where this is "a relation not of mere power but rather of authority". This is sometimes true, but not always. One way to show this is to
point to those cases where an agent is split between practical identities. A
heroin addict can be under the sway of a practical identity which requires
her to live a certain way; and she may feel that if she cannot live that way,
she could just as well be dead (or, to put this a bit differently, she may be
willing to die to get what the practical identity requires.) But she may not
endorse that identity except at those times when she is immersed in it. She
may find herself crying out at other times, with Paul in his letter to the
Romans, "The evil that I would not, that I do". As Paul goes on to say, "So
then, with my mind I am a slave to the law of God, but with my flesh I am a
slave to the law of sin." The fact that, while I am a slave to sin, I feel that my
very identity is at stake in obtaining some good does not show that I have
an obligation, let alone an unconditional obligation, to obtain it. It is true
that while an agent is immersed in a practical identity, she cannot question
the overridingness of the reasons which the identity gives her for action.
But this can easily be a measure of power rather than authority.
Why do I say that feeling her identity is at stake does not itself show that
an agent has an obligation? Because I do not want to say that a Nazi who
has reflectively endorsed killing Jews is given an obligation to kill them
just by his endorsement. G.A. Cohen gives us the case of the idealized
Mafioso, "When he has to do some hideous thing that goes against his
inclinations, and he is tempted to fly, he steels himself and we can say of
him as much as of us, with the same exaggeration or lack of it, that he
steels himself on pain of risking a loss of identity."12 Here Korsgaard bites
the bullet. She argues that the Mafioso does have the obligation to do the
hideous thing (though it is not a moral obligation but some other undefined kind). "There is a sense," she says, "in which these obligations are
real -not just psychologically but normatively. And this is because it is the
endorsement, not the explanations and arguments that provide the material for the endorsement, that does the normative work."13 On her view, if
the Mafioso (or the Nazi) can endorse reflectively the judgement that he
should go out and kill, then he should. Korsgaard is prepared to say, for
example, that if human beings decided that human life was worthless, then
it would be worthless. "The point is just this: if one holds the view, as I do,
that obligations exist in the first-person perspective, then in one sense the
obligatory is like the visible: it depends on how much of the light of reflection is on." I hasten to add that Korsgaard goes on to say that the Mafioso
has a deeper obligation to give up his immoral role. This is because "the
activity of reflection has rules of its own; and one of them, perhaps the
most essential, is the rule that we should never stop reflecting until we
have reached a satisfactory answer, one that admits of no further questioning ....Following that rule would have led the Mafioso to morality".
Korsgaard feels she has to concede that the Mafioso has the obligation to

KORSGAARD'S KINGDOM AND SOURCES

375

do the hideous thing, because of her position that "it is the endorsement
that does the work". On her view, the endorsement creates the obligation.
She reaches this view by rejecting what she thinks is its alternative, namely
that obligations are things we discover, and her reason is that this kin.d of
substantive moral realism cannot help us with the normative question. (I
will return to her reasons for saying this in a moment.) I think she has fallen into a trap here. It is wrong to think that we have to choose between a
substantive version of moral realism on the one hand and constructivism
on the other. This dichotomy is seductive, but it overlooks an important
kind of middle ground. 14 The dichotomy suggests that if obligations are not
something we discover (as we might discover a new sub-species of armadillo), this commits us to saying that they are something we create (as though
they were like armchairs). But there is an important possibility to consider,
that obligations are not like either of these. The prescriptivist insight of R.
M. Hare, which Korsgaard does not seem to have considered, is that there
is the same kind of grammatical mistake in saying we create obligations as
in saying we discover them. The mistake is what R.M.Hare calls lithe
descriptivist fallacy", taking the term from J. L. Austin. Austin, in tum,
appeals to Kant. lilt has come to be commonly held that many utterances
which look like statements are either not intended at all, or only intended
in part, to record or impart straightforward information about the facts: for
example, 'ethical propositions' are perhaps intended, solely or partly, to
evince emotion or to prescribe conduct or to influence it in special ways.
Here too KANT was among the pioneers. We very often also use utterances in ways beyond the scope at least of traditional grammar. It has
come to be seen that many specially perplexing words embedded in apparently descriptive statements do not serve to indicate some specially odd
additional feature in the reality reported, but to indicate (not to report) the
circumstances in which the statement is made or reservations to which it is
subject or the way in which it is to be taken and the like. To overlook these
possibilities in the way once common is called the 'descriptive' fallacy."Is
There is nothing wrong with saying that to make a normative judgement is
to claim to state a normative fact, but we should be alert to the possibility
that saying this disguises from us that normative judgements have their
own distinctive kind of grammar. In particular, as Austin warned us, we
need to be alert to the possibility that such judgements are intended, solely
or partly, to evince emotion (as the emotivists said) or to prescribe conduct
or a kind of life (as the prescriptivists said). One way to be guilty of the
descriptive fallacy is to assume that to know the meaning of a normative
word like "good" is just like knowing the meaning of "red", namely to
know to what we mayor may not apply it. 16 So we look for obligations or
values, in the same spirit as we might look for sub-species of armadillo.
And we assume that if we do not find them in the world independently of
us, they must be like (not armadillos but) armchairs, things we have made.
But the assumption is a mistake, the mistake of thinking that language
always works in the same kind of way.17 This is the mistake of those who
think they have to move from a rejection of substantive moral realism to a
creative moral (anti-) realism. I8
Korsgaard rejects what she calls "substantive moral realism", which is
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the introduction of intrinsically normative entities into our ontology.!9 Her
central reason for rejecting it is that it is no help with what she calls "the
normative question", with justifying the claim that we have obligations at
all. Substantive realism is here simply redundant; it says we have obligations because theyexist. 20 She does not appeal to Wittgenstein at this point,
but her objection is reminiscent of what he says about "idling" or language
"going on holiday".2! Or we might make the point as Aristotle does, in
reply to Plato's realism about the good, that the form is "of no use"
(mataion).22 Substantive moral realism is different from what Korsgaard
calls "procedural moral realism", which grants that there are moral truths,
moral facts and moral knowledge, but holds that these are derivative from
the procedures by which we answer moral questions. Procedural moral
realism is thus constructivist.23 A procedural realist holds that "there are
facts, moral truths, about what we ought to do, but that is not because the
actions are intrinsically normative. They inherit their normativity from
principles which spring from the nature of the will -the principles of practical reasoning." The procedural moral realist thinks that there are answers
to moral questions because there are correct procedures for arriving at them.
The substantive moral realist thinks that there are procedures for answering
moral questions because there are moral truths or facts which exist independently of those procedures, and which those procedures track. Korsgaard
construes Kant as a procedural moral realist, in terms of this distinction.
But if we accept the prescriptivist insight I mentioned earlier, we can see
that there is a kind of moral realism which lies between substantive moral
realism as Korsgaard construes it and procedural moral realism. I want to
layout a proposal on this intermediate ground which I think is both true
and consistent with Kant, though I cannot prove that Kant actually held it.
I will call this proposal "transcendent moral realism", for want of a better
label. I am relying here on an overall interpretation of Kant's philosophy
which distinguishes three moments in it: empirical realism, transcendental
idealism, and transcendent realism. I cannot defend this interpretation
here, but it is a traditional one.24 On this interpretation, the objects of our
experience should be construed as real; but when we consider the transcendental conditions of our experience, we have to concede that the
objects of our knowledge are constituted under the categories of the understanding. So far the idealism. But Kant does not waver in his commitment
to the view that the things in themselves are themselves also real, though
they transcend our knowledge. Kant's position, as I understand it, is that
we are entitled to certain beliefs about this transcendent world, because
these beliefs are required by what he calls "the fact of reason," that we are
under the moral law. I want to suggest that these beliefs give us a good
way to understand the intuition that the good is, so speak, more fundamental than the evil, though our experience is full of both good and evil.
According to this intuition, when we will what is good, we repeat or fit a
goodness which underlies the universe as a whole. I think this intuition is
religiously compelling, though it is obscure as I have stated it. I am going
to urge a way of construing it that avoids both substantive moral realism in
Korsgaard's sense and creative moral (anti-) realism.
Transcendent moral realism is quite consistent with the prescriptivist
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insight I described above. For us to make a right moral judgement is, on
this view, not to state that the noumenal world is a certain way (for example, to state that God wills something), but to repeat in our wills the willing
of a postulated divine being. Kant's ethics has this vertical dimension
throughout his career, and Korsgaard neglects it. 25 The moral law is the law
of the Kingdom of Ends of which we are merely members, not the head.
Korsgaard glosses the Kingdom of Ends as "the republic of all rational
beings", and talks about personal friendship as "a kingdom of two".26 But it
is important to Kant that the relationship between the sovereign and the
ordinary members of the kingdom is not symmetrical. "A rational being
belongs to the kingdom of ends as a member," Kant says in the Groundwork,
when, although he is the legislator of its universal laws, he is also himself
subject to these laws; "he belongs to it as its head, when as the legislator he is
himself subject to the will of no other."27 It is important that this passage
comes in the Groundwork just a few pages before his discussion of heteronomy, which is much more familiar. The head of the kingdom of ends is God,
for Kant, and this is a constraint on our interpretation of what Kant goes on
to say about heteronomy and divine command. I have argued elsewhere
that Kant endorses autonomous submission to God's commands, and that
he is objecting in the Groundwork not to Divine Command Theory in general but to a particular form of it which he f01md in Crusius. 28 For now,
what is important is that Kant's language about making the law should not
be construed as a form of creative (anti-) realism. I will illustrate this by
pointing to a more extreme form of expression which Kant allows himself
to use, although I think he would have been amazed by some of the interpretations it has been given in the twentieth century. He says, "The righteous man may say: I will that there be a God".29 What does Kant mean?
That we create God? No. If we did create God, God would be unable to do
what Kant thinks it is morally necessary that we believe God can do, namely to transcend radically the capacities of our intellect and will. It is this
transcendence that enables God to play the role of head of the kingdom of
ends, where we are merely members of this kingdom. What Kant means by
talking of our will is that we appropriate God, or make God our God. We
have to commit ourselves into the hands of this king of the kingdom of
ends. Kant is not a creative (anti-) realist about God. He thinks we are
required to believe that God exists as creator, ruler and judge. In the same
way, when he says that we make the moral law, he is not a creative (anti-)
realist about moral obligation or moral value. He is saying that we have to
appropriate the moral law, to make it our law. This is the first-person perspective that Korsgaard rightly insists upon. The moral law is always a law
for an agent. But it does not follow from this first-person perspective that
"the obligatory is like the visible: it depends on how much of the light of
reflection is on." It is the descriptive fallacy which leads to the quest for
something analogous to the visible which can be the kind of entity constituted by the agent's reflective endorsement.
We can return, then, to the Mafioso or the Nazi and revise what we
should say about his obligations. Does he or does he not have the obligation to do the hideous thing? Immediately the question has to be, who is
talking here? If Korsgaard says, "The Mafioso has an obligation to do the
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hideous act", then she is prescribing. But she gives us abundant evidence
that she does not share the Mafioso's practical ideal, and the fact that he
endorses it does not show that she has to do so. This is why her report
that he has reflectively endorsed some ideal does not serve as a source of
the normativity of her judgement that he has an obligation. We can say
that she has reported that he has a source for normative judgement as long
as we do not interpret this word "source" veridically, to imply that (in our
judgement now) there really is such normativity flowing from this source.
There is a complication here. It is possible to argue that the Mafioso has a
prima facie obligation to do whatever he thinks he has an obligation to do,
without making the argument depend on creative moral (anti-) realism. I
think Korsgaard is not always clear which form of the argument she is
using. She quotes Cohen's point, "that there is a real sense in which you
are bound by a law you make for yourself until you make another".30 The
point is that I could argue in my own voice that people should be conscientious, meaning that they should do what they think they should do, other
things being equal. If I make such an argument, then the "source" of the
first person normativity here is my endorsing the virtue of conscientiousness; though it will then follow that if the Mafioso thinks he should do
some hideous thing, I can use his endorsement as my criterion for the
judgement that he should do it, other things being equal (which in this
case, I judge that they are not, as shown by my use of the term "hideous").
What is the significance of the recognition (erkenntnis) of duties as divine
commands? I want to make four points about this. First, if one supposes
the duty is God's command, then one will suppose that God will make it
possible for the duty to be fulfilled. God does not ask a person to do what
is impossible. It might be replied that to believe something is one's duty is
already to believe it possible, simply because "ought" implies "can"; this
will be true whether one recognizes duties as God's commands or not. But
while the reply is true, it ignores the point that the kind of assistance that is
believed available is different if it is God who is believed to be providing it.
There will accordingly be a different assessment of what one's duties can
be, as constrained in this way by possibility. A person can believe that she
ought to do something (for example, forgive an enemy) even though she
cannot do it by her own devices, or by any human devices, but only by
God's help. In this case, the required assistance comes inside her, to enable
her to will something very difficult. In other cases, the required assistance
may come outside her, the removal of some outside impediment.
Believing in the possibility of God's assistance changes what we believe
morality can demand of us. A subsidiary point here is that we have to
believe that we can will the good, ranking it above even our own happiness. Believing in the possibility of God's assistance allows us to believe in
the possibility of what Kant calls "the revolution of the will", by which this
ranking is accomplished.
A second point is that if a person supposes a duty to be God's command, she will suppose that it is consistent with her own happiness in the
long run. This is one part of Kant's moral argument. It is already implied
by the first point, if the premise is added that we can only will what we
believe to be consistent with our own happiness in the long run. The con-
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ception of God in Kant's moral argument is of a perfectly rational and
omnipotent being, who will therefore bring about the greatest good which
is virtue and happiness in strict proportion. But theists who dislike Kant's
emphasis on rationality can have a moral argument that emphasizes God's
love instead. The conception of the greatest good is a world in which
everyone is virtuous and everyone is happy, and this is Kant's translation
of the psalmist's idea of righteousness and peace embracing each other
(Psalm 85: 10). This is the world, we can say, that a perfectly loving being
will create to the extent that it is consistent with the possibility of human
beings also choosing evil.
There are, third, the various features of God's character that make possible the successful coordination of the different ends of the different members of the kingdom of ends. God sees into our hearts, and so knows what
we really want. God's omniscience also allows knowledge of what is best
for us, even if we do not want it, and knowledge (at least on some
accounts) of the consequences for the kingdom of the general adoption of
the various maxims we propose. God's holiness of the will is not tempted
to diverge from what is right by inclination or partiality. So God is able,
because of these characteristics, to coordinate the ends of all the members
of the kingdom into a coherent whole. There is a difference, therefore,
between thinking of a maxim as prescribed by another mere member of the
kingdom, and thinking of it as prescribed by the head of the kingdom. We
could think of the maxim prescribed by God as what any member would
prescribe who was omniscient, omnibenevolent and so on, though there
are various conceptual difficulties lurking in these counterfactuals.
Finally, there is the point that God is, in traditional doctrine, Lord of history, and can thus bring the kingdom of ends to its fruition. We can have
not merely moral faith but moral hope. Kant says that the kingdom of
heaven is represented "not only as being brought ever nearer, in an
approach delayed at certain times yet never wholly interrupted, but also as
arriving".31 To recognize our duties as God's command is to see those
duties as part of a life which is, so to speak, on the winning side.
Transcendent moral realism thus gives us a robust form of moral realism, which is not open to the central objection Korsgaard raises against
what she calls "substantive moral realism". Transcendent moral realism
does significant work. It is not mere 'idling'. It makes an important difference to moral life if we believe that we live in a universe that makes sense
of our moral efforts. And transcendent moral realism is not merely the
expression (in a misleadingly metaphysical mode) of the conviction that
the world sustains moral effort. It is not merely the reductive claim that the
world can somehow be described in a factual way and that we can then
make the judgement that the world (so described) fits our purposes if they
are morally permissible. 32 This reductive claim does give a reading to the
intuition that there is good undergirding the world, but it is not transcendent moral realism, as I am trying to analyse it. The transcendent moral
realist thinks that our purposes, if they are morally permissible, fit the purposes undergirding the world. This is, so to speak, the direction of fit. If
transcendent moral realism is true, it will also be true that things as they
are fit our moral purposes; but this will be a secondary or derivative truth.
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A prescriptivist who wants to recognize her duties as God's commands
will be careful not to say that "x is my duty"means just "x is commanded
by God". Rather, she will say that she aspires, when she prescribes something as her duty, to recapitulate God's prescription for her willing. The
claim about meaning is false for a prescriptivist because it is possible for an
agent to say "x is commanded by God" without prescribing x. (Presumably
Satan and his angels are such agents.) One way for the agent to go from
the recognition that x is commanded by God to the prescription of x is, in
the language 1 used earlier, to make God her God. It is only if she has
appropriated God in this way that she can express the prescription that x is
her duty by saying "x is commanded by God". If she agrees with Kant's
limitations on the reach of human knowledge, she will not claim to know
that she is recapitulating God's will; but she will nonetheless aspire to that
recapitulation. Autonomy on this reading will be autonomous submission.
Transcendent moral realism is not the claim that we have to think of our
morality as if it recapitulated the prescriptions of a transcendent moral
being, even though there is no commitment within the moral life to the
existence of such a being. Kant is sometimes interpreted this way, but this
is certainly not his view. Indeed, when he says (as already quoted), that
the righteous man may say, "1 will that there be a God", he is denying this.
R. M. Hare takes an "as if" position about the archangel who is the prototypical critical thinker (as opposed to the prole, who is the prototypical
intuitive thinker); there is no commitment to the belief that there is any
such being. The archangel is needed only as a possible being, to make
sense of the structure of moral thinking. But for Kant, recognizing our
duties as God's commands is like recognizing our true beliefs about the
material world as deriving from how things are in themselves. It is not
that we should think of our true beliefs AS IF there were such a relation to
things in themselves, where no belief that there are things in themselves is
implied. It is true that in the case of duties, as in the case of beliefs, we do
not know (according to Kant's view of knowledge) that the relation obtains.
But to hold a belief true and to recognize a maxim as a duty just is in both
cases to be committed to the existence of the relation.
I will end by conceding that there is a danger in transcendent moral
realism, that one simply reads off one's ethical views onto the foundation
of the universe. This has been the constant tendency of thinkers who have
grounded normativity in the structures of creation. They have ended by
defending the prevailing power structures of their societies. Reflection on
this fact led Karl Barth to say that the Fall of Adam and Eve should be
understood as "the establishment of ethics".33 Barth is not, however,
despite appearances, rejecting the whole project of ethical inquiry. He
wants to reject a certain notion of autonomy, according to which the
human subject is absolutely self-determinative (this would be, in my terms,
autonomy without submission); and he wants to replace it with a theological version of ethical realism. Nigel Biggar summarizes the view this way,
"Instead of aspiring to equal the Creator and so to play the Lord, it is proper for the human creature to recognize and accept the divine decision,
stand upon it, and, by way of repetition, witness to it. It is thus that she
acts well. Correlatively, in so far as she seeks to make moral judgements

KORSGAARD'S KINGDOM AND SOURCES

381

without reference to the prior judgement of God, in so far as her ethics are
not basically an attempt to correspond to that judgement, she recapitulates
the original sin of pride."34
Korsgaard's work is of seminal importance in the contemporary understanding of Kant's moral philosophy. But her systematic downplaying of
the vertical dimension of this philosophy, together with an implicit
descriptivism, have led to the false dichotomy between substantive moral
realism and creative (anti-) realism which I have discussed in this review. I
think Kant's answer to the normative question would go like this. We and
God are both authors of the obligation in accordance with the law, though
not symmetrically, but neither we nor God are the authors or creators of
the law because it does not have a creator at all. Creative (anti-) realism is
therefore false. Our own reason binds us unconditionally; but we still have
the Idea, beyond the categories of the understanding, of a supreme lawgiver, to whom we have duties but who has no duties to us. We can properly
see our duties as this lawgiver's commands. 35 This does not make Kant
liable either to Korsgaard's objections to substantive moral realism or to
Kant's own objection to heteronomy.36
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